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Coups d’état have occurred around the world since time immemorial but have been more 
commonplace amongst African states. They have typically yielded bloodshed 
and instability and, they inevitably culminate in the gross violation of the most basic human 
rights. They also arguably constitute a perennial threat in the politics of African 
states and, they have been condemned in numerous instances. Such condemnation brings to the 
fore, questions as to international law’s position on coups d’état. In light of International 
law placing a high premium on the doctrine of national sovereignty, it is tempting to 
conclude that coups d’état are beyond the scope of international law thus not 
being proscribed. This position is further strengthened by the absence of international 
treaties/conventions proscribing coups d’état. It can, however, be argued that the recognition 
given to the notion of democracy by some treaties/conventions such as the UDHR, CEDAW, 
and ICCPR, may amount to an implicit proscription of coups d’état under international 
law. There is also, a right to democracy, along with a proscription of coups d’état 
under customary international law as reflected by state practice. African states, being specially 
affected by the scourge of coups d’état, have played a leading role in the development of 
the customary international law proscription of coups d’état. Regardless of it being difficult for 
state responsibility to ensue, coups d’état constitute wrongful acts at international law.  
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
I. INTRODUCTION
Coups d’état have occurred around the world since time immemorial. In recent times, however, 
they appear to have been more commonplace amongst African states than elsewhere. Arguably, 
coups d’état constitute a perennial threat in the politics of African states. These coups d’état 
have yielded varying consequences, such as massive bloodshed and instability in their 
respective states. They have also aroused a myriad of reactions such as condemnation, along 
with the imposition of economic sanctions on the international spectrum. This brings to the 
fore questions as to the international law position in that regard. Oftentimes, international law 
is perceived as an extremely contentious body of law. Consequently, the content, place and 
function of numerous concepts in international law remain unsettled and warrant perpetual 
debate. Such concepts include democracy and that of national sovereignty, among others. 
It is, therefore, no surprise that Bennet and Strugg characterise ‘sovereignty’ as a fluid 
concept depending on context and hold the position that the discussion as to the characteristics 
of a sovereign state is not settled.1 Schriver, however, narrows down the central tenet of 
national sovereignty as being that of a state having ultimate dominion over its own affairs.2  
Due to the high premium placed on the sovereignty of states, international law 
traditionally perceived the internal form of government of states as solely and exclusively 
falling within the respective states’ jurisdiction.3 An exception to this would be where a state 
intentionally and expressly abnegates its dominion.4 
With sovereignty being a key precept of statehood5 and states as the primary subjects 
of international law,6 it follows that the sovereignty of states is the cornerstone of the 
international law regime. Further, state sovereignty arguably dictates that the internal affairs of 
states are sacrosanct and ought to be free from external interference. This would include the 
1 Tom W Bennet and Jonathan Strugg ‘Introduction to International Law’ (2013) at 47. 
2 Nico Schrijver ‘The Changing Nature of State Sovereignty’ (2000) at 71.  
3 Gerard Kreijen (ed) ‘State, Sovereignty, and International Governance’ (2002) at 6. 
4 Stephen D Krasner ‘The Hole in the Whole: Sovereignty, Shared Sovereignty, and International Law’ (2004) 
at 1077. 
5 S B M Marume, R R Jubenkanda, C W Namusi and N C Madziyire ‘An analysis of essential elements of the 
State’ (2016) 5 International Journal of Engineering Science Invention 3 at 24. 




form of transition from one government to another and the transfer of power thereof, among 
other things. In that background, this research is aimed at examining whether international law 
proscribes coups d’état and, if Africa has played a role in the development of such a 
proscription. 
 
II.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In order to answer the central question on the legality of coups d’etat vis-à-vis international 
law, this research will examine the following questions:  
1) What are the effects of coups d’état? 
2) Has Africa experienced a disproportionately higher number of coups d’état globally 
and, what are the causes of such coups d’état in Africa? 
3) Does Africa remain susceptible to coups d’état? 
4) What are the International Law norms on coups d’état and do coups d’état constitute 
wrongful acts at international law? 
5) Is democratic governance a right under international law? 
 
III. SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 
In approaching this research, a library and desk-based methodology was used, and all the 
information relied on by this dissertation was obtained without any fieldwork. The research 
builds on existing literature on coups d’état and democracy among other subjects and, it 
incorporates a blend of published and unpublished work. While it builds on both primary and 
secondary sources, this research mainly relies on secondary sources. Among others, the 
primary sources consulted and analyzed include treaties, conventions, and charters such as the 
United Nations Charter7, the African Union Constitutive Act8 and the African Union Charter 
on Democracy, Elections and Governance9. The secondary sources incorporated herein are 
mainly in the form of applicable textbooks, papers and journal articles authored by a variety of 
scholars, among other material. 
 
7 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945. 
8 Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Constitutive Act of the African Union, 1 July 2000. 






There is very limited academic writing on the interplay between coups d’état and the 
international legal framework. There is, therefore, a limited range of academic literature on 
which certain sections of this research rely. This dissertation thus uses non-academic sources 
in some instances. Owing to the library and desk-based methodology employed in this research, 
some sections of this dissertation largely rely on secondary data. This has potential implications 
on the aptness, accuracy and reliability of some of the data, among other things. The research 
will however make use of datasets compiled by renowned and credible researchers and research 
units respectively. It is also not possible, for the purposes of this research, to consider every 
single instance of a coup d’état on the African continent. A purposive sampling technique will 
therefore be employed. This potentially exposes sections of this research to researcher bias. 
This research will however try to widen the sample base as far as possible while also comparing 
the findings thereof with those of other scholars and researchers. 
 
V. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter 1: Background and Introduction 
Apart from introducing the research, the first chapter serves as an overview of the dissertation 
and the concepts being dealt with herein. It also highlights the research questions, aim of the 
study, the research methodology employed, the shortcomings of the methodology and, the 
nature of the sources relied on. It ultimately provides a detailed structure and roadmap of the 
dissertation. 
Chapter 2: The notion of a coup d’état 
The second chapter unpacks coups d’état holistically. It adopts a working definition and briefly 
unpacks the concept of a revolution. The intention is to clearly distinguish the character of 
revolutions from that of coups d’état. It also ultimately seeks to generally examine the impact 
and effects of coups d’état on the respective states. In doing so, it considers the idea of a 
‘democratic coup d’état’ and the interplay between coup d’état and human rights. 
Chapter 3: Coups d’état and Africa 
The third chapter examines the trends regarding coups d’état and tracks the distribution of this 




has experienced a disproportionately higher number of coups d’état globally and, it also briefly 
explains the distribution of coups d’état across the continent. It ultimately briefly considers the 
causes of coups d’état in Africa. 
Chapter 4: The international law on coups d’état 
The fourth chapter probes the international law norms on coups d’état. This shall be considered 
from an international, continental, and regional standpoint. The chapter also considers the 
Specially Affected States doctrine and the extent, if any, that it can be useful in establishing 
the international law norms on coups d’état. This stems from the research’s focus towards 
Africa, coupled with the claim that Africa has disproportionately experienced more coups 
d’état than elsewhere in the world. The chapter also assesses whether coups d’état amount to 
wrongful acts at international law and whether democracy is a right under international law. 
Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations  
The fifth chapter serves as the final and concluding chapter of the dissertation. It collates the 
findings of each of the previous chapters. This chapter also provides certain recommendations 




CHAPTER 2:  THE NOTION OF A COUP D'ÉTAT 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter lays the foundation of the study on coups d’état. The chapter shall unpack the 
notion of coups d’état holistically. This shall be achieved by adopting a working definition of 
a coup d’état. While acknowledging the similarities between the two, for purposes of clarity, 
the chapter shall distinguish coups d’état from revolutions. It shall also consider the general 
effect of coups d’état and the idea of a ‘democratic coup d’état’. The chapter ultimately 
considers the interplay between coups d’état and human rights and the implications thereof. It 
argues that coups d’état inevitably culminate in the gross violations of the most basic human 
rights. In dissecting all these concepts, the chapter makes reference to African examples of 
coups d’état. 
 
II. THE NOTION OF A COUP D'ÉTAT 
Within French etymology, the word ‘coup’ denotes a sudden ‘blow or stroke’1. The notion of 
coups d’état has generated several scholarly definitions over time. This research, however, 
relies on the description of Luttwak (1969). Luttwak explains that a coup d’état ‘consists of the 
infiltration of a small but critical segment of the state apparatus, which is then used to displace 
the government from its control of the remainder’.2 This is typically carried out by ‘the military 
or other elites within the state apparatus’3 hence being commonly referred to as ‘military 
coups’. The military officers in some instances then go on to form the next government or, 
install a civilian government heavily backed by them, usually maintaining their control and 
influence in the establishment vicariously. Coups are often referred to as either bloody or 
bloodless with the former characterised by violent means and fatalities,4 while in terms of the 
latter, only the threat of use of force is employed as the means to seize power.5 The most 
 
1 Oxford Colour French Dictionary Plus (3rd ed.), New York: Oxford University Press Inc. 
2 Edward Luttwak Coup d'État: A Practical Handbook (1969) 172. 
3 Nhlalo Ndaba ‘Army trucks in Harare spark panic; military insiders urge calm’ Times LIVE 14 November 
2017, available at https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2017-11-14-army-trucks-in-harare-spark-panic-
military-insiders-urge-calm/, accessed on 14 September 2019. 
4 Luttwak op cit note 2. 
5 Fundikila Wazambi ‘Military Coup D’état against Democratically Elected Governments in Africa and 




prominent examples of bloody and bloodless coups respectively would be the Nigerian coup 
(and counter-coup) of 1966, and Mauritanian coup of 2005 or the Zimbabwean Coup of 2017, 
all of which are briefly described below. 
a) The Nigerian, Mauritanian, and Zimbabwean Coups D'état 
On the 15th of January in 1966, a cabal of young military officers toppled Nigeria’s 
democratically elected government through a violent military coup to curb ‘corruption and 
ethnic rivalry’.6 Six months later, Nigeria experienced yet another exceedingly violent military 
coup. With multiple fatalities and several displacements recorded,7 the Nigerian coups of 1966 
are often classified among Africa’s bloodiest coups to date.  
This is in sharp contrast to the Mauritanian coup of August 2005, where a cabal of 
military officers, seeking an end to ‘totalitarian practices’ and stating that they would govern 
for just two years, toppled President Maaouiya Ould Taya, who had himself ascended to 
presidency two decades prior via a military coup.8 Although many people were reported to 
have fled the capital, no casualties were recorded and the transition was reported as having 
been ‘bloodless’.9  
In a similar fashion, on the 14th of November 2017, some officers of the Zimbabwe 
Defence forces seized control of the national broadcaster and effectively put President Robert 
Mugabe and certain key members of his administration under house arrest.10 This was followed 
by heavy military presence in the capital11 and a nationally syndicated broadcast by the military 
officers stating that the events taking place were not a coup; rather, the military was targeting 
‘criminals around the president’ who were responsible for the apparent socio-economic 
collapse within the country, and insisting that the situation would ‘return to normalcy’ upon 
them achieving their goal.12 Coupled with other factors, these events consequently resulted in 
 
6 Max Siollun ‘How first coup still haunts Nigeria 50 years on’ BBC News 15 January 2016, available at 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35312370, accessed on 19 September 2019. 
7 Ibid. 
8 ‘Bloodless coup in Mauritania’ News 24 3 August 2005, available at 
https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Bloodless-coup-in-Mauritania-20050803, accessed on 19 September 
2019. 
9 Ibid. 
10 ‘Zimbabwe's Mugabe 'under house arrest' after army takeover’ BBC News 15 November 2017, available at 
 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41997982, accessed on 19 September 2019. 
11 Op cit note 5 at 11. A mass uprising in the wave of the Arab spring, later on reinforced by the Egyptian 
Military ultimately culminated in the removal of President Morsi from presidency. 
12 Op cit note 10. Also see ’Zimbabwe Military Maj. Gen. S.B. Moyo After Seizing State TV: 'Not A Military 
Takeover' NBC News 15 November 2017 available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=63NQvtB435I, 




President Mugabe’s resignation from office13 along with the arrests and exile of certain key 
members of his government. A new administration heavily backed by and including certain 
military protagonists subsequently took over. This operation was also widely reported to have 
been peaceful and bloodless14 and, the threat of the use of force, among other factors, effected 
regime change. 
b) Forms of Coups D'état 
It is trite to note that coup events take different forms, such as successful coups and failed coups 
among others.15 As is the case in some examples referred to above, successful coups typically 
culminate in either effective regime change, mere replacement of the incumbent or, arguably, 
even democratization, while in terms of the latter, the operation is thwarted, hence not effecting 
any change.16 The most recent failed coups include the Gabonese17 and Ethiopian18 attempts 
of January and June 2019 respectively. Largely, however, the thrust of this research is on 
‘successful coups d’état’, being the ones that culminate in a transfer of governmental power. 
c) Revolutions 
Other than regular and democratic elections, military coups and revolutions have historically 
been common methods resulting in the change of or in governments. World history is replete 
with instances of both coups d’état and revolutions and, the divide between the two phenomena 
has in some instances, become obscured. In turn, this has constantly triggered debates as to 
whether certain events match the profile of revolutions or coups d’état instead as was the case 
with the deposition of Egypt’s President Mohamed Morsi in 2001.19 Like that of the coup 
d’état, the concise definition of what counts as a revolution remains contested. This research, 
however, adopts the definition which states that revolutions are ‘irregular, extraconstitutional, 
 
13 Peta Thornycroft, Roland Oliphant & Louise Burke ‘Zimbabwe's president Robert Mugabe finally resigns, 
sparking wild jubilation on the streets of Harare’ The Telegraph 21 November 2017, available at 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/11/21/zimbabwes-president-robert-mugabe-has-resigned-speaker-says/, 
accessed on 14 September 2019. 
14 John Campbell ‘Military Coup in Zimbabwe Remains Bloodless’ Council on Foreign Relations 15 November 
2017, available at https://www.cfr.org/blog/military-coup-zimbabwe-remains-bloodless, available on 14 
September 2019. 
15 Monty G. Marshall and Donna Ramsey Marshall ‘Coups d’état Events, 1946-2017 Codebook’ (2018) Center 
for Systemic Peace at 1. 
16 Jonathan Powell ‘Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d'état’ (2012) 6 The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 46. 
17 ‘Gabon coup attempt: What happened?’ BBC News 7 January 2019, available at 
https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-46785012/gabon-coup-attempt-what-happened, accessed on 18 
September 2019. 
18 ‘Dozens killed in foiled Ethiopia coup attempt, authorities say’ France 24 26 June 2019, available at 
https://www.france24.com/en/20190626-dozens-killed-foiled-ethiopia-coup-attempt-authorities-say-abiy-
ahmed-amhara, accessed on 18 September 2019. 




and sometimes violent changes of political regimes and control of state power brought about 
by popular movements’20. Owing to the grey areas between coups and revolutions, it is 
therefore key to distinguish the two from each other for the purposes of this research. 
d) Coup versus Revolution 
Coups and revolutions share the commonality of being irregular forms of change of 
government. They do however possess a few contrasts. Coups d’état are elite in nature, with a 
small group of powerful people, typically military officers, leading the operation.21 This 
sharply differs from revolutions, which are heavily characterised by grassroots involvement 
and mass mobilisation.22 Some coups do however enjoy mass support, while some revolutions 
have been reinforced, or even hijacked by, the military.23 Coups also typically target the 
leadership, ultimately toppling a government and installing a new one.24  
Revolutions are however more nuanced and often culminate into paradigm political and 
socio-economic transformation.25 Whereas revolutions are often punctuated by mass 
mobilization and protests for extended periods, coups are typically sudden.26 Arguably, 
revolutions are typically marred by chaos, violence or serious bloodshed, while coups are not 
always characterised by political and/or economic turmoil.27 
 
III. EFFECTS OF COUPS D'ÉTAT 
Coups d’état are by nature, unconstitutional, and, characterised by the derogation of democratic 
processes.28 While some coups are bloodless, the immediate and long-term effects of coups 
d’état generally can be confined to the violence, bloodshed and displacement.29 This brings the 
issue of human rights into the fray. Coups d’état ultimately culminate in the immediate 
transition in a country’s leadership, often directly into the hands of the military. Military rule 
is typically authoritarian and corrupt and historically, military governments have not performed 
 
20 Jeff Goodwin No Other Way Out STATE AND REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS 1945-1991 (2001) 9. 
21 Wazambi op cit note 5 at 9. 
22 Goodwin op cit note 20. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky ‘A Theory of Revolution’ (1967) 3 Journal of Conflict Resolution 11 
at 265. 
25 Goodwin op cit note 20. 
26 Peter Siani-Davies ‘The Romanian Revolution of December 1989’ (2007) at 268. 
27 Tanter and Midlarsky op cit note 24. 
28 Mohammed M Uddin ‘Distinguishing Legality and Legitimacy of Coup d’état: Looking Beyond Kelsen’ 3 
International Journal of Law and Legal Jurisprudence Studies 4 at 1. 




better than elected, civilian governments in Africa.30 Military governments in Africa have 
typically failed to forge political order,31 perpetuating instability which in turn has far-reaching 
implications on spheres such as the economy and human rights.  
As evidenced by, among other things, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 
and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions against coups d’état highlighted 
in the 4th Chapter, coups d’état are widely deemed to be undemocratic, hence their 
condemnation from time to time. As such, coups d’état have been described as a perpetual 
threat against budding democracies.32 Scholarship has emerged suggesting that coups d’état 
are not always negative phenomena. Some coups d’état have been referred to as ‘democratic’/ 
‘good’ coups d’état. 
 
IV. THE DEMOCRATIC COUP D'ÉTAT 
A common argument is that while coups d’état are generally deemed to possess autocratic 
overtones, some coups, in fact, usher in and perpetuate democracy.33 This is because such 
coups are typically carried out in response to widespread contestation of autocratic regimes.34 
Such autocratic regimes typically refuse to relinquish power following such contestation and 
are subsequently toppled by an often well-respected military via such coups d’état. The military 
ultimately facilitates constitutional processes like credible elections within a short timespan 
thereby ushering in democratic change, with the military sometimes constituting a caretaker 
government pending a democratic transition.35 Varol refers to this as ‘The Democratic Coup 
d’état’. In terms of this framework, a coup against a non-autocratic regime cannot, therefore, 
match the profile of a ‘democratic coup d’état’.36 Following from this, most coups d’état do 
not fall under the bracket of ‘democratic coups d’état’ as they are typically carried out against 
democratically elected governments and give birth to autocratic regimes. In that light, Varol 
acknowledges that ‘democratic Coups d’état’ thus constitute an exception to the norm.37 
 
30 Patrick J McGowan ‘African Military coups d'état, 1956-2001: Frequency, Trends and Distribution’ (2003) 
41 Journal of Modern African Studies 3 at 340. 
31 Ibid. 
32. Mohammed M Uddin ‘Distinguishing Legality and Legitimacy of Coup d'État: Looking Beyond Kelsen’ 3 
International Journal of Law and Legal Jurisprudence Studies 4 at 1. 









Examples of coups d’état deemed to be ‘democratic’ include Mali38 in 1991 and 
Guinea-Bissau39 in 2003. A more prominent example is the Nigerien coup40 of 2010 where 
President Mamadou Tandja was toppled by the military after having dissolved parliament and 
passed a referendum effectively extending his tenure as president by an additional three (3) 
years.41 The coup leaders then went on to establish a Supreme Council for the Restoration of 
Democracy (SCRD) to govern, and to ‘make Niger an example of democracy and good 
governance.’42 This was widely accepted by the citizens while the opposition parties touted 
this as a chance to revive democracy.43 
a) The Egyptian Democratic Coup D’état 
A more recent example to illustrate Varol’s idea of a ‘democratic coup d’état’ is the Egyptian 
Coup d’état of 2011 which culminated into the deposition of President Hosni Mubarak. The 
actions of the military were preceded by nearly a month of widespread demonstrations and 
civil resistance by multitudes of Egyptians, highlighting several grievances and demanding an 
end to years of autocracy and calling for the removal of the ‘highly corrupt and autocratic’ 
Mubarak administration, while also calling for it to be replaced by a democratic government.44 
With the backing of the masses, the Egyptian Military then seized power, igniting widespread 
celebrations in Egypt and beyond.45  
This was followed by an announcement of the suspension of the constitution and the 
dissolution of parliament, along with the formation of a transitional government for a six-month 
period leading to elections.46 During this period, political parties and organisations were 
allowed to organize themselves freely and to participate in the series of widely popular 
elections that followed, with the exception of President Mubarak’s National Democratic Party 
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which was dissolved by an Egyptian superior court for ‘monopolizing power’ and electoral 
fraud, among other things.47 This election cycle was highly characterized by the triumph of the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the election of Mohamed Morsi as president.48 
The Morsi government, however, faced criticism for effectively shrinking the newly 
opened democratic space. This was characterised by attempts by president Morsi to influence 
the adoption of a Muslim leaning constitution by issuing a presidential decree elevating 
presidential pronouncements above judicial review.49 Such attempts went on to trigger mass 
protests ultimately resulting in his deposition also via yet another coup d’état.50 It can be argued 
the Egyptian coup d’état of 2011 did, in fact, tick all the boxes thus amounting to a ‘democratic 
coup d’état’ as it was topped off by elections widely deemed to be democratic. Events of this 
sort are, however, exceptions rather than norms and, coups d’état are actually not 
systematically linked with democratization.51 Rather, coups d’état typically oust dictators and 
replace them with new ones.52 It should however be noted that credible elections are a 
cornerstone of democracy,53 thus coups d’état are by nature non-democratic even though they 
may potentially end dictatorships while ushering in democracy.  
Under the transitional government in the aftermath of the Mubarak presidency, 
numerous reports of abuses including attacks and deaths of protestors who challenged alleged 
attempts by the interim government to consolidate and maintain its grip on power.54 This placed 
yet another dent on the transition and it brings to the fore the question as to whether coups 
d’état set the stage for other infractions of international law. 
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b) Coups d’état and Human rights 
Human rights have since become widely recognised as falling under international law and 
therefore cannot be curtailed in the name of state sovereignty.55 In light of this, certain human 
rights norms have evolved into customary international human rights law.56 Democratic and 
competitive elections are often considered as being correlated to progressive human rights 
conditions,57 while coups d’état are deemed to antagonize democratic processes. There is 
typically an inverse relationship between human rights and the proliferation of militarism in 
Africa.58  
Historically, coup regimes have often carried terrible human rights records be it during 
their seizure of governmental power or during their incumbency.59 The wide-ranging idea of 
‘human rights violations’ is broadly characterised by the infraction of rights relating to physical 
integrity, socioeconomic and cultural rights60 among other rights. Coups d’état are however 
typically associated with infringements relating to, but not limited to, bodily integrity, freedom 
of speech, free political participation, and justice. Coup regimes often perpetrate such 
violations as means to seize governmental power and/or ultimately sustain it. Such violations 
provide a strong justification for the proscription of coups d’état under international law as 
international law increasingly places a high premium on human rights.61 
(i) Physical Integrity Rights 
At the top of human rights violations are those relating to bodily integrity. In the context of 
coups d’état, these are typically violations in terms of which the state, using its coercive 
machinery, arbitrarily infringes on the civilians’ physical integrity.62 Such infringements often 
take place in the form of state-sponsored attacks and violence, enforced disappearances, 
political incarceration, torture and extrajudicial killings among other things.63 Violations 
relating to bodily integrity are arguably the most prominent forms of human rights violations 
whether in coup situations or beyond.  
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As alluded to above, the Egyptian coup d’état of 2011, although being deemed to have 
been ‘good’ or ‘democratic’, was also marred by reports of gross human rights violations 
relating to bodily integrity, perpetrated by the transitional government. Historically, some of 
the worst reports of similar violations emerged from the respective coup regimes of Jean-Bédel 
Bokassa in the Central African Republic, Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha in Nigeria, and 
Idi Amin in Uganda, among others.64 
(ii) Political Rights and Freedoms 
Coups d’état also structurally infringe on the right to free political participation.65 Furthermore, 
coups d’état are by nature undemocratic as they impose regimes without the consent of the 
governed.66 They, therefore, take away the people’s capability to self-govern.67 This, coupled 
with coups being deemed to sire dictatorships thereby inevitably shrinking the democratic 
space, amounts to a deprivation of the people’s democratic rights such as participating in free 
and fair regular elections.68 This extends beyond merely the change of government to even 
constitution-making and other internal processes of the state that are pivotal to democratic 
governance.69 This state of affairs is, among other states, reflected in Uganda’s history of coups 
d’état and dictatorship.70 
(iii) Freedom of Expression 
In shrinking down the space for free political participation, coups d’état inevitably broadly 
clamp down on freedom of expression, to include freedom of speech,71 among other freedoms. 
With coups d’état imposing regimes without the consent of the governed, coups d’état 
negatively impact on the right of the governed to express themselves via the ballot in choosing 
their government via credible elections.72 The military is often deemed to be ill-suited to 
acknowledge freedom of expression broadly and particularly, freedom of speech, bearing in 
mind the totalitarian nature of military command structure.73 In the case of coups d’état, this is 
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often reflected in the conduct of the military regimes during their incumbency, with coup 
regimes often inclined to censor and control sources and outlets of information.74 
(iv) Access to justice 
Coups d’état also often alter the structure of the state and compromise the independence of the 
judiciary and the partiality of judicial processes.75 This inevitably infringes on the right of 
access to justice. It is worth noting that coups d’état, being undemocratic, are in themselves 
punctuated by a curtailment of due process.76 It can be argued that judges, by remaining in 
office even where a coup d’état has taken place, effectively endorse the new regime as in some 
systems, judges are perceived to embody and reflect the government’s legitimacy and 
authority.77 This, however, places judges in a conundrum since if they continue to follow the 
pre-coup legal order and constitution, their rulings may not be complied with as coup regimes 
often rule by decree.78 This also leads to judicial chaos and, the judges also risk being dismissed 
from their positions.79 
 
V. CONCLUSION  
This chapter defined a coup d’état as being characterised by the infiltration of a small but 
critical segment of the government, typically by the military, which then seizes governmental 
power.80 The chapter also drew a distinction between ‘failed’ and successful coups d’état, 
defining the former and the latter as being thwarted and, culminating in the seizure of power 
and change of government respectively. Focusing on successful coups d’état, the chapter 
further looked at the difference between ‘bloody’ and ‘bloodless’ coups d’état. It characterised 
the former as being punctuated by violence, bloodshed and human casualties while in terms of 
the latter, only threats of violence are employed in the seizure of power. The chapter also briefly 
distinguished coups d’état from revolutions while conceding some similarities between the two 
phenomena in some instances. Considering the effects of coups d’état, it submits that while 
other coups d’état are deemed to be good/democratic, coups d’état are in themselves 
counteractive to democracy and are illegal. Further, coups d’état inevitably breed gross 
infractions of the most basic human rights. The next chapter considers the global trends and 
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distribution of coups d’état. It takes a closer look at coups d’état and Africa. It will serve as a 
background to subsequent discussions on the legality or otherwise of coups d’état within the 




CHAPTER 3: COUPS D'ÉTAT AND AFRICA 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on the prevalence of coups d’état in Africa. It seeks to chiefly establish 
whether Africa has experienced a disproportionately higher number of coups d’état in 
comparison with other continents. The chapter, therefore, performs a data analysis in which it 
shall consider global coup trends between 1950 and 2017. In doing so, it shall track the global 
frequency and distribution of coups d’état. It shall also specifically look at the spatial and 
temporal distribution of coups d’état in Africa. Based on the data analysis, the chapter shall 
generally explain the distribution of coups d’état. The chapter ultimately briefly considers 
scholarly writings on the causes of coups d’état in Africa while also seeking to determine 
whether African states remain susceptible to coups d’état. 
 
II. COUPS D'ÉTAT AND AFRICA 
Kufuor alludes to ‘a rarity’ of constitutional governmental transitions in African politics.1 He 
labels coups d’état, as being among the most prominent and consistent features thereof.2 The 
focus of this dissertation is on successful coups d’état post World War II (1945). The end of 
World War II coincides with the advent of decolonization and democratization in Africa, with 
Ghana being the first African state to attain independence a few years later, in 1957. This period 
is particularly important as the wave of decolonisation saw the emergence of a largely 
significant portion of sovereign states at present.3 It is trite to note that by definition, coups 
d’état take place within states and, colonies are not states.4 As such, coups are unique to states.5 
In order to track the distribution of coups d’état across the world historically, this chapter relies 
on a dataset compiled by Powell and Thyne on global attempts between years 1950 and 2017.6 
Some of the statistics therefrom are illustrated in Figure 1 below: 
 
1 Kofi O Kufour ‘The OAU and the Recognition of Governments in Africa: Analyzing Its Practice and 
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2 Ibid at 370. 
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4 Robert Jackman, Rosemary O'Kane, Thomas Johnson, Pat McGowan and Robert Slater ‘Explaining African 
Coups d’état’ (1986) 1 American Political Science Review 80 at 256. 
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6 Silvia Romanelli ‘Coups d’état. (1950 and 2017)’ available at https://silviaromanelli.com/2018/05/12/coups-






Figure 1: Countries that experienced coup(s) d’état between 1950 and 20177 
Within this period, up to ninety-seven (97) countries encountered coup attempts, both 
successful and unsuccessful. Out of all these countries, only seventy-eight (78) have 
encountered at least one successful coup d’état. Thirty-six (36) out of the seventy-eight (78) 
countries which have experienced at least one successful coup d’état are in Africa, followed 
by nineteen (19) in Asia, ten (10) in South America, eight (8) in North America and five (5) in 
Europe.  
It is important to note that South America has had the highest percentage of countries 
that encountered successful coups d’état over other continents, with about 83% of the countries 
(ie. ten (10) out of twelve (12)) having encountered a minimum of one successful coup d’état. 
This is followed by Africa, with about 66% (thirty-six (36) out of fifty-four (54)). Asia comes 
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after Africa 39% (nineteen (19) out of forty-eight (48)), followed by North America 34% (eight 
(8) out of twenty-three (23)). Europe has been the least affected on a global scale, having just 
11% (Five (5) out of forty-four (44). This research however particularly focuses on Africa 
therefore, South America is beyond the scope of the chapter. The focus on Africa stems from 
the premise that Africa, being the continent with the most counties, has had the highest number 
of countries having experienced coups compared to other continents. Africa as a whole is also 
peculiar as it has continuously experienced recurring coups d’état versus other continents to 
date. Further, Africa remains susceptible to coups d’état. These facts shall become apparent in 
sections that follow. 
Several countries have however experienced multiple and recurrent coup events. The 
global coup instances between 1950 and 2017 are illustrated in Figure 2 below: 
 
Figure 2: Global Coup instances between 1950 and 20178 
Globally, only twenty-three (23) countries have each experienced a single successful 
coup d’état, with twelve (12) of them being in Africa. Powell and Thyne’s coup dataset9 also 
reflects Four Hundred and Seventy-Six (476) global coup instances between 1950 and 2017, 
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with Two Hundred and Thirty-Five (235) having been successful. Of the successful coups 
d’état, Africa has experienced One Hundred and Seven (107), followed by Asia and the Middle 
East with Fifty-Three (53), South America with Thirty-Seven (37), North America with Thirty 
(30), and Europe with Eight (8).  
Powell and Thyne’s dataset also reflects an uneven distribution of coups d’état in Africa 
geographically. The trends are illustrated in Figure 3 below: 
 
Figure 3: Geographical/regional distribution of Successful Coups d’état Across Africa10 
Between 1950 and 2017, West Africa has had the highest prevalence of coups d’état 
with fifty-two (52), followed by East Africa with nineteen (19), Central Africa with fifteen 
(15), North Africa with twelve (12), and Southern Africa having the lowest prevalence with 
just five (5) successful coups d’état.  
The prevalence of successful coups d’état in Africa has also varied from decade to 
decade between 1950 and 2017 as illustrated in Figure 4 below: 
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Figure 4: Temporal Distribution of Successful Coups d’état in Africa.11 
A total of three (3) successful coups d’état were recorded between 1950 and 1959 
followed by a sharp rise to twenty-two (22) between 1960 and 1969. There was a slight 
recession between 1970 and 1979 where nineteen (19) coups were recorded, followed by a 
slight increase between 1980 and 1989 where once again, twenty-two (22) coups were 
recorded. Fifteen successful coups were recorded between 1990 and 1999 followed by nine (9) 
and eight (8) from 2000 to 2009 and from 2010 to 2017 respectively. The data reflects a notable 
decline in successful coups on the continent. 
a) Explaining the distribution of coups d’état 
The data analysis conducted above reflects that the countries with the highest prevalence of 
coups d’état are mostly in close proximity with each other and largely fall under the same 
geographical regions. Following from this, bigger regions as far as the number of states is 
concerned, generally seem to have experienced a higher number of coups d’état. 
An overwhelming majority of the coups d’état have also generally been witnessed in 
older African States (by date of independence). Most of these states are located in West Africa. 
Younger regions as evidenced by Southern Africa (being the youngest region) have 
experienced the least number of coups d’état to date.  
Further, most coups d’état have been witnessed in the ‘Global South’. This term largely 
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mostly underdeveloped, low-income states and, often culturally and/or politically 
marginalized. This description matches most African states, the majority of which do not rank 
highly on the Human Development Index.12 Regionally, there is an inverse relationship 
between the coup prevalence rate and the Human Development Value ie, regions with a lower 
development index value have experienced a high prevalence of coups d’état. 
 
III. CAUSES OF COUPS D'ÉTAT IN AFRICA 
Several scholars have studied the causes of coups d’état in Africa with Jackman (1978) 
attributing coups in new states, between 1960 and 1975, chiefly to cultural pluralism, social 
mobilization/modernisation, and political factors including mass participation and a variety of 
political parties.13 Jackman alludes to a direct relationship between the existence of a dominant 
ethnic group within the state apparatus, along with social mobilisation, and instability in new 
sub-Saharan states.14 He further alludes to another direct relationship between multi-party 
democracies and instability in comparison with the existence of a single dominant party in the 
African context.15 Building on Jackman’s work, Johnson, Slater, and McGowan (1984) go on 
to suggest that fewer coups d’état were experienced in ‘states with relatively dynamic 
economies whose societies were not very socially mobilized before independence and which 
have maintained or restored some degree of political participation and political pluralism…’ in 
contrast to those with directly opposing characteristics.16  
McBride (2004) and Collier and Hoeffler (2007) however examine the Military itself 
in an attempt to establish the determinants of a coup, with the former suggesting that military 
involvement in civilian politics is for largely personal reasons and ‘greed’, while according to 
the latter, a direct relationship can be perceived between the likelihood of coups d’état and the 
level of military spending by government.17 Collier and Hoeffler (2007) observe that, in 
countries where there is a high coup risk, governments typically allocate significant portions 
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of their national budgets and resources towards military spending while the inverse is true in 
states where coups have a low likelihood.18  
Luckham (2001) attributes the high prevalence to coups d’état in Africa to the colonial 
legacy, particularly citing the inheritance of colonial political systems.19 While most African 
states have a colonial history, this claim, according to Souaré (2006), however, fails to account 
for some of the African countries with a comparatively high prevalence of coups yet having 
divergent colonial backgrounds.20 This theory further fails to account for states like Ethiopia 
and Liberia, which do not have colonial backgrounds and yet have still experienced coups 
d’état, among others. 
It is submitted that largely, the factors highlighted in this brief discussion of the causes 
of coups d’état in Africa are still present. To date, Africa still enjoys considerably high levels 
of ethnic diversity stemming from factors such as the formation of big colonial countries and 
relatively low levels of urbanisation, among others,21 both of which arguably reflect the legacy 
of colonization. Bearing Africa’s high diversity in mind, ethnicity has, and continues to play a 
key role in the politics of African states. Further, it can be argued that since the advent of 
decolonization and independence, there has been a rise in multipartyism and pluralism across 
the continent. Being in the global south, most African states rank lowly when it comes to 
economic development globally.22 Although there are emerging reports on the decrease of 
Military spending by African states, the spending remains relatively high.23 Owing to these 
factors among others, African states remain susceptible to coups d’état. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This chapter looked at global coups d’état trends between 1950 and 2017 and demonstrated 
how, percentage-wise, more South American countries have experienced coups d’état. South 
America is however beyond the scope of this research. Further, a disproportionately higher 
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number of states in Africa have however experienced coups d’état compared to other continents 
on a global scale, followed by Asia, South America, North America, and Europe respectively. 
The chapter went on to look at the distribution of successful coups d’état within the African 
continent and established an uneven distribution of coups in Africa regionally. West Africa has 
had a disproportionately higher prevalence of coups d’état trailed by East Africa, Central 
Africa, and North Africa respectively while Southern Africa has been the most stable thus 
having the lowest coup prevalence continentally. The chapter then examined the temporal 
distribution of coups in Africa between 1950 and 2017 and demonstrated a gradual decline in 
continental coup instances since 1980. Pursuant to the data analysis on global coups d’état 
trends, the chapter also explained the general distribution of coups d’état in Africa. The chapter 
ultimately considered the causes of in coups d’état Africa. It submitted that largely, the factors 
that have historically caused coups d’état in Africa remain extant. Following from this, African 
states remain susceptible to coups d’état. The next chapter considers the legality of coups d’état 






CHAPTER 4: THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON COUPS D'ÉTAT 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter examined the trends and distribution of coups d’état across the world, 
establishing that Africa has experienced more coups d’état than other continents. Having 
demonstrated the disproportionately high prevalence of coups d’état in Africa, this chapter 
considers the international law on coups d’état. It specifically seeks to establish whether coups 
d’état are in themselves outlawed under international law. This is because coups d’état are 
widely deemed to be unacceptable and have been condemned from time to time although there 
is uncertainty over the legal status of such condemnation at International law.1 This probe shall, 
in some instances, be tackled from an international, continental, and regional standpoint.  
The chapter will also crisply consider the Specially Affected States (SAS) doctrine and 
the extent, if any, that it can be useful in establishing the international law norms on coups 
d’état. This will be done considering the research’s focus towards Africa coupled with the 
claim that Africa has experienced more coups d’état that elsewhere in the world. The chapter 
also assesses whether coups d’état amount to wrongful acts at international law and, whether 
international law recognises democracy as a right. Before examining the sources of 
international law, the chapter shall begin by briefly looking at state sovereignty and its 
relevance in the conversation concerning coups d’état and international law. 
 
II. STATE SOVEREIGNTY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
With the focus of this dissertation being on coups d’état, which occur within states, it is 
imperative to briefly consider the notion of state sovereignty. This is because international law 
recognises states as its primary subjects2 and, it predicates its authority on the consent of states.3 
State sovereignty is also recognised among the basic components of statehood.4 Pursuant to 
this, international law, therefore, recognizes the sovereignty of states among its key tenets. 
While the idea of state sovereignty under international law is arguably fluid and remains 
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contested, an underlying theme of the state having ultimate dominion over its territory and its 
internal affairs exists.5 This implies that the internal affairs of state are sacrosanct and ought 
not to be subject to any external interference whatsoever. Such internal affairs arguably include 
the form and nature of transition from one government to another and, the transfer of power 
thereof, among other things. From this alone, a position can be taken that prima facie, 
international law does not proscribe coups d’état in any way whatsoever as it does not concern 
itself with the internal affairs of states. In order to test this position and dissect it further, the 
chapter shall turn to the sources of international law. 
 
III. SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
In trying to understand the functioning and effectiveness of International law in addressing the 
high prevalence of coups in Africa, it is imperative to consider its sources. The International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) Statute6 under Article 38 is deemed to provide an authoritative position 
regarding the traditional sources of International Law.7 This is because the ICJ statute is a key 
component of the United Nations (UN) Charter,8 thereby being part of the United Nations 
system. Flowing from this, every member of the UN is automatically a state party to the ICJ 
Statute.9 Article 38(1) of the Statute10 reads as follows:  
‘1. The Court, whose function it is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states;  
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;  
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;  
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.’11 
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These sources can be distinguished into either formal or material sources,12 with formal 
sources being those from which rules of law derive their validity and authority while material 
sources provide the content and substance of the rules.13 This distinction has however been 
criticized due to the overlap existing sometimes between these sets of sources resulting in the 
lack of a clear separation.14 Such distinctions are thus not worth pursuing for the purposes of 
this chapter. It is however key to examine the sources of international law per article 38(1) of 
the ICJ Statute15.  
a) General Principles of Law 
The ‘general principles of law…’ form part of the sources of both national and international 
law that have enjoyed widespread recognition.16 They however only serve as a subsidiary 
source of International law in the absence of treaties or custom.17 They are therefore only 
relevant in instances where a separate legal obligation is already in existence.18 The importance 
of such general principles is however such that when a particular position is supported by 
universal public opinion, the courts are justified in taking them.19  
b) Judicial decisions and the teachings 
Like the general principles of law, judicial decisions and the writings of legal scholars are 
subsidiary in nature and are used in determining the rules of law.20 They, however, are not 
independent sources of international law but, when considered in tandem with general 
principles of law and custom, they are pivotal in ascertaining the existence of particular rules 
under international law.21 International law knows no system of precedent. It should therefore 
be noted that judicial decisions are subject to Article 59 of the ICJ Statute,22 which emphasises 
that their binding force is limited to the parties to the matter under consideration.23 They, 
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14 Malcolm N Shaw International Law (1986) at 58. 
15 ICJ Statute supra note 10. 
16 Cherif Bassiouni ‘A Functional Approach to ‘General Principles of International Law’’ (1990) 11 Michigan 
Journal of International Law 3 at 768. 
17 Ibid p 782. 
18 Bassiouni Op cit note 16 p 782. 
19 Martens Bos ‘A Methodology of International Law’ (1984) p70. 
20 Michael Peil ‘Scholarly Writings as a Source of Law: A Survey of the Use of Doctrine by the International 
Court of Justice’ (2012) 1 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 3 p 136-137. 
21 Shaw op cit note 14 p86, 88. 





however, remain pivotal as the ICJ, being the chief judicial organ under the UN system, is 
widely regarded as having an authoritative voice in interpreting international law.24  
Furthermore, when many states, through their courts, accept particular principles as 
legal justifications for arriving at certain decisions, this may count as proof of widespread 
acceptance of such principles and such decisions form part of international law. As far as the 
writings of leading and highly qualified legal scholars are concerned, it is particularly difficult 
to ascertain what exactly falls under this bracket. This consequently limits the weight and 
authority of such scholarship although it continues to be relevant in litigation and in analysing 
the development of international law, among other things as they can be consulted from time 
to time in determining the content of international law.25  
Given the fact that general principles of law and judicial decisions along with scholarly 
writings are only subsidiary in nature, this chapter shall not examine them as standalone sources 
of international law. Their strength will be examined in the light of existing treaties and custom. 
The focus of this chapter will therefore be on treaties and custom as sources of International 
Law.  
c) International Conventions/ Treaties 
International conventions are arguably the most frequent and specific conduits through which 
rules under international law are created.26 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties27 
(Vienna Convention) recognises international conventions as a source of international law.28 
The term ‘convention’ is synonymous with treaties, covenants, memoranda of understanding, 
acts, pacts, and protocols among other agreements.29 While a proliferation of terms is apparent, 
a golden thread running through all such agreements is that of a union of intentions of a 
minimum of two subjects of international law in order to regulate their respective interests by 
international rules.30 Such consensus of state parties, as captured in the treaties, provides 
certainty and makes treaties the most binding and robust source of international law. Treaties 
as a source of international law afford states a significant level of freedom in the determination 
of rights and duties, they may want to create for themselves. This freedom is however fettered 
 
24 Shaw op cit note 14 p86. 
25 Ibid p 89. 
26 Shaw Op cit note 14 at 77 -81. 
27 United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Shaw op cit note 14 at 76. 




by article 53 of the Vienna Convention31 which highlights that treaties become void if, on 
conclusion, they contravene ius cogens.32 Treaties traditionally bind states party to them.33 In 
some instances, treaties may, however, appear to bind states that are not party to them by virtue 
of them being a codification of CIL. The Vienna Convention is one such example of a treaty 
whose provisions are widely acknowledged as a codification of CIL.34 Additionally, some 
treaties do evolve into custom, with the Geneva conventions being the most prominent 
examples of this.35 Custom as a source of international law shall, however, be discussed below. 
(i) United Nations Conventions/ Treaties on coups d’état and democracy 
The condemnation of coups d’état by the international community in several instances, has 
warranted the perception of coups d’état being an international crime.36 International Law at 
the UN level is however devoid of treaties/conventions expressly proscribing coups d’état. It 
is worth noting that international agreements have historically and typically been vague in their 
make-up. This can mostly be attributed to the need for consensus in such agreements in the 
process of their formulation. An express and specific rejection of coups d’état via 
treaties/conventions would arguably be atypical. A broader subject would therefore be that of 
‘democracy’. This particularly comes into play following from the assertion that coups d’état 
by nature, are counteractive to democracy.37 
The UN Charter, being a very prominent treaty under International Law, is devoid of 
any express mention the term ‘democracy’.38 Its preamble, however, commences with the 
words ‘We the people…’, which can be argued to be an implicit embodiment of democratic 
values, with the legitimacy of sovereign states stemming from the ‘will of the people’. With 
sovereignty of states being a central theme under international law, this also arguably implicitly 
elevates the importance of democracy. 
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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights(UDHR)39 describes the ‘will of the 
people’ as being the ultimate source of governmental power.40 Further, such ‘will’ is to be 
expressed via regular, democratic elections.41 The UDHR on its own does not command 
binding force and it merely serves as a framework on Human Rights at International Law.42 
Scholarship has however emerged suggesting that several UDHR provisions have evolved into 
Customary international law thus binding all states.43  
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) on the other hand 
actually establishes the legal grounds for democratic principles at international law. These 
include the freedom of opinion and expression,44 freedom of association,45 the right to 
participate in public affairs,46 and the right to vote and to be elected in regular and democratic 
elections.47 With 172 states party to it, nearly 90% of the UN member states have signed up to 
the ICCPR. Nearly all African countries have signed up to the ICCPR except South Sudan and 
the Western Sahara. 
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW)48 also alludes to democratic values when it obliges its member states to ensure 
gender equality in exercising the right to vote and be eligible for election,49 to participate in 
government policy formulation,50 and to hold public office51 among other things. The 
convention has also been ratified by 189 states, which translates to about 98% of the UN 
member States. This includes most African states, with the exception of Somalia and Sudan. 
From this, it is submitted that there is no express proscription of coups d’état by 
international conventions/ treaties. To an extent, given the recognition given to the notion of 
democracy, particularly by the UDHR, CEDAW, and ICCPR, it can, however, be argued that 
this translates to an implicit proscription of coups d’état under international law. 
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(ii) African Conventions/ Treaties on coups d’état and democracy  
At the African Union level, three main instruments are of importance regarding the subject of 
coups d’état and also democracy namely, the AU Constitutive Act (AUCA),52 Lomé 
Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of 
Government53 (Lomé Declaration) and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and 
Governance.54 
The Lomé Declaration was adopted by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and 
subsequently adopted by the AU. Put together in the background of the ‘resurgence of coups 
d’état in Africa’, the Lomé declaration characterises coups as an unacceptable threat to African 
peace and security and as being ‘disturbing’ and antagonistic to the continent-wide and 
continuing wave of democratization. It also recognizes that coups d’état on the continent have 
culminated in the most blatant violations of both AU and UN principles. The Lomé Declaration 
essentially proscribes coups d’état, as being unconstitutional changes of government. The 
declaration on its own is, however, not legally binding although it enjoys widespread political 
acceptance and still serves as a guide in many instances, including the measures the AU can 
take in the event of such unconstitutional transitions.55 
The AU Constitutive Act, the founding document of the African Union, highlights its 
rejection and condemnation of unconstitutional changes of government56 among its guiding 
principles. It also stipulates that governments rising to power unconstitutionally, be suspended 
from participating in AU activities.57 This can be interpreted as an express proscription of coups 
d’état under the AU constitutive Act. The AU constitutive has been ratified by all member AU 
member states thus which makes it binding on them. 
In its Preamble, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance 
(ACDEG) recognizes democracy as one of the universal values and principles. It also signals 
its concern about unconstitutional changes of government and their role in perpetuating violent 
conflict, insecurity and instability on the continent. In its objectives, the charter also endeavours 
to promote the adherence to such ‘universal values and principles’ of democracy by the AU 
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member states. The Charter also prescribes the imposition of sanctions58 by the African Union 
in the event of unconstitutional transitions, which include coups d’état,59 among other forms. 
The ACDEG is a legally binding document that has more than 80% of African States as 
signatories. 
The African framework on coups d’état and democracy can therefore be interpreted as 
an express proscription of coups d’état given the acknowledgement of democracy among 
‘universal values and principles’ at international law, the rejection of extraconstitutional 
changes of government, and the prescribed response in the form of suspension from AU 
activities, along with the imposition of sanctions. 
(iii) Regional Conventions/ Treaties on coups d’état and democracy  
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
The SADC treaty,60 SADC’s founding document, acknowledges the need for the ‘guarantee of 
democratic rights, observance of human rights and the rule of law’ in its preamble. It further 
outlines, as part of the body’s principles, the rule of law, solidarity, democracy, peace and 
security, and human rights.61 The treaty, however, does not expressly proscribe coups d’état or 
any other extra-constitutional change of government. 
The treaty also provides for the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, whose 
purpose and objectives are expressed in the SADC Protocol on Politics, defence and security62. 
The protocol acknowledges, as part of its objectives, the promotion of the development of 
democratic institutions and practices within SADC member states, along with the respect for 
universal human rights,63 among other objectives. In accordance with the Organ’s drive 
towards the management of inter and intra-state conflict via peaceful means, the protocol 
deems military coups as being forms of intra-state conflict.64  
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Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
The ECOWAS treaty,65 the ECOWAS founding document, does not expressly proscribe coups 
d’état. The treaty, however, lists the ‘promotion and consolidation of a democratic system of 
governance...’66 in its member States among its fundamental principles. The ECOWAS 
Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance67 affirms ‘Zero tolerance for power obtained or 
maintained by unconstitutional means’68 and, popular participation along with ‘strict adherence 
to democratic principles....’69 among its Constitutional Governance Principles. Under Section 
IV, the protocol prescribes the role of Security Forces in a democracy as being that of defending 
the independence and territorial integrity of countries and their democratic institutions.70 The 
protocol also prescribes that the various components of the member states’ security sectors 
should be under legal, civilian authorities.71 
The Protocol also prescribes the imposition of wide-ranging sanctions on the state in 
question where ‘democracy is abruptly brought to an end by any means’ or where there is a 
serious infraction of human rights.72 It also states that apart from the sanctions, a decision may 
be taken, at the recommendation of the Mediation and Security Council, to turn to the conflict 
management regime prescribed by the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism For Conflict 
Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security 73 which may include the 
deployment of civilian and military force to maintain or enforce peace and security where 
needed.74 
Neither the SADC nor the ECOWAS frameworks expressly proscribe coups d’état. 
Furthermore, the SADC framework’s acknowledgement of democracy is not as forceful as that 
of ECOWAS, which observes a ‘strict adherence to democratic principles while, totally 
rejecting the seizure of governmental power by unconstitutional means. The ECOWAS 
framework solidifies its commitment towards democracy and the rejection of the 
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unconstitutional seizure of governmental power by also prescribing the imposition of sanctions 
where democracy is interfered with. 
d) International Custom as a Source of International Law 
In most modern domestic legal systems, custom is typically inconsequential as far as the law 
is concerned.75 It is however a prominent and dynamic source of international law76 considering 
the make-up of the international system and, how it lacks a well-defined and centralised 
governmental system like that under municipal law. As alluded to earlier in the chapter, 
customary rules derive from the behaviour and practice of states. In ascertaining the behaviour 
and practice of states, it may be useful to consider the respective states’ historical archives, 
newspapers, official legal manuals on questions of law, legal opinions of national legal advisors 
and, diplomatic exchanges, among other things.77 One may also consider the municipal laws 
of the states in question,78 along with the respective governments’ response to national court 
decisions, the International Law commission’s draft articles, treaties, and the general practice 
of international organisations, among other things.79 The International organisations in 
question include the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security 
Council, both of which come up with resolutions from time to time.80 
The states, in acting in a particular way, must believe that they are bound by a legal 
obligation (opinio juris) and that acting otherwise would be illegal.81 This makes Customary 
international law difficult to decipher as the practice of states is not written down compared to 
treaties as alluded to above. It is deemed to be by far the most widespread source of 
international law, arguably binding all states, except those that persistently object to the rules.82 
This is in stark contrast with treaties as discussed above as their reach is typically confined to 
their signatories. Notwithstanding the unwritten nature of state practice, customary 
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international law remains binding upon states.83 It should also be noted that in some instances, 
it is possible to have rules that only bind a particular group of states.84 This can be referred to 
as local custom85 and it is a position supported and confirmed by the ICJ in the Asylum case86 
where the court held that a party relying on a particular custom should prove the existence of 
the custom to the extent that it binds the other party in question.87 The ICJ, while laying out the 
requirements for state practice to translate into customary international law in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Case88 states that ‘…state practice, including that of states whose interests 
are specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of 
the provision invoked….’.89 This brings to the fore the Specially Affected States (SAS) 
Doctrine, which is of significant importance regarding CIL, in light of the high premium 
seemingly placed on the practice of such states. This doctrine will however be discussed later 
in the chapter. 
(i) International Custom on Coups d’état and Democracy 
With treaties being deemed as indicative of state practice in some instances90 and, having 
established the absence of treaties expressly proscribing coups d’état at UN level, compounded 
with the absence of ICJ rulings in that light or, rooted in democracy, it can be inferred, at first 
glance, that there is no international custom against coups d’état. Further, it can also be inferred 
that there is no right to democracy at international law. It should however be noted that the 
UDHR91 under Article 21(3) describes ‘the will of the people’, expressed via regular, 
democratic elections, as the ultimate source of governmental authority.92 This provision is key 
as it is commonly argued that the UDHR has in fact evolved into CIL.93 As alluded to earlier, 
a state’s internal affairs, including the form of governmental transition, were traditionally 
deemed as exclusive to the respective state and sacrosanct.94 The post-cold war era has however 
been characterised by increasing popularity of democracy under international law. This 
popularity is evidenced by the majority of UN member states having legally committed to 
 
83 ICJ Statute op cit note 6 at Article 38(1)(b). 
84 Shaw, supra note 14 at 79; Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), International Court of Justice (ICJ), 20 
November 1950 at 266. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Asylum Case Supra note 84. 
87 Ibid at p 276. 
88 North Sea Continental Shelf Case supra note 81. 
89 Ibid at p 43. 
90 Ibid.  
91 UDHR op cit note 39. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Reisman op cit note 42. 




allowing open, secret ballot and multi-party elections.95 It has commonly been argued that the 
legitimacy of governments has increasingly ceased being exclusively tested against the states’ 
respective internal standards.96 Instead, such legitimacy ought to be measured against universal 
norms and standards, which include democracy.97 This is otherwise referred to as the 
‘democratic entitlement’ and it falls in sharp contrast with the rigid and traditional variant of 
exclusivity in the name of state sovereignty. This inevitably influences the status of coups 
d’état at international law, with scholars arguing that by inference, the emergence of norms on 
the ‘democratic entitlement’ inevitably entails a proscription of coups d’état at international 
law as the ascension of governments to power via coups cannot be reconciled with democratic 
norms.98 
(ii) Customary International Law Proscription of Coups d’état  
In some instances, the condemnation of coups d’état preceded the advent and prominence of 
democratic norms to the extent that, for example, in the early 20th century, Central American 
states imposed sanctions in response to coups d’état.99 The cold war, however, saw an increase 
in the relative toleration of coups d’état since, in some instances, some blocs embraced this as 
a way to eject governments seen as bearing different ideologies.100 This however changed post 
the cold war as the legitimacy of states was increasingly recognised as being premised on their 
respective sources of power, particularly the democratic origin thereof.101 With the increasing 
recognition and prominence of democratic norms came the systematic rejection and increased 
condemnation of coup regimes.102 
 
IV. STATE PRACTICE 
The post-cold war period has been characterised by attitudes against the unconstitutional 
overthrow of governments. This chiefly stems from the notion that democracy ought to be an 
irreversible process.103 The condemnation of coups d’état by states is by nature ex post facto 
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owing to its perceived contravention of democratic principles,104 thus the community of states 
only being able to react after the coups d’état. The condemnations are also typically coupled 
with diplomatic and economic sanctions, along with pressure to revert to democracy, with 
states, in some instances even going to the extent of expressing their support of the toppled, 
democratically elected governments.105 Such measures are also employed, and have in 
numerous cases been endorsed by International Organisations. 
a) State Practice and International Organisations 
Consideration of the actions of international organisations is paramount in establishing 
customary international law as these actions commonly reflect state practice. Like the states, 
international organisations have also condemned and in some instances imposed sanctions 
against coup regimes. Some organisations have, over time, formalised their mechanisms for 
the imposition of sanctions via treaties and formal proclamations, among other means. 
The United Nations, however, being the most prominent international organisation 
collectively at international law is, in fact, devoid of treaties proscribing coups d’état, Further, 
the ICJ has never made a ruling relating to coups d’état, nor has it grounded any of is rulings 
on the principles of democracy since its inception. Instead, taking cognisance of the ICCPR 
and CEDAW’s positions,106 along with their respective, widespread acceptance, an argument 
can be made supporting the existence of international custom recognising democracy as a right/ 
entitlement. 
In attempting to establish international custom, it is imperative to turn to General 
Assembly and Security Council resolutions as they may reflect the practices of the community 
of states.107 
(i) UNGA Resolutions on Democracy (Post-Cold War) 
The UNGA has perennially adopted resolutions relating to democracy and democratic 
principles in the post-cold war period (1991 to date). Some of the most prominent of these 
resolutions were around the immediate aftermath of the cold war, concerned with South Africa 
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and Haiti. In its 46th session, among several other resolutions concerning Apartheid South 
Africa, the UNGA adopted a resolution on international efforts on eliminating apartheid along 
with the establishment of a non-racial, democratic South Africa.108 In terms of this resolution, 
the UNGA called upon South Africa’s representatives to engage, in good faith, in processes 
that would ensure, among other things, a ‘successful transition’ to a democratic order’.109 This 
was followed by a similar resolution during the UNGA’s 47th session in which the UNGA 
encouraged the community of states to aid the transition and process towards the adoption of a 
new, non-racial and democratic constitution in South Africa.110 During the 48th Session, the 
UNGA yet again adopted a similar resolution, where it expressed its concern on the instability 
that would potentially derail the transition to a democratic, non-racial South Africa.111 It also 
welcomed the development of an electoral framework complementing the transition in that 
regard.112 This was further reiterated in the UNGA Resolution on Democratic and non-racial 
elections in South Africa.113 The UNGA ultimately endorsed South Africa’s democratic 
transition and congratulated it for the successful process.114 
The UNGA also adopted a resolution on democracy and human rights in Haiti115 in 
which it reiterated the position in the UDHR, of the will of the people, expressed via regular 
and genuine elections as being the source of governmental authority.116 The UNGA also 
condemned the illegal replacement of the democratically elected president in Haiti and called 
upon states to take measures in support of the UNGA resolutions in that regard.117 In 
subsequent resolutions on the same matter in its 47th session, it reiterated the goal of the 
international community as being that of restoring democracy in Haiti and, it called upon the 
international community to impose arms embargos on Haiti until it reverted to democracy.118 
The UNGA persistently reiterated its position on this matter and the matter was kept open and 
it carried over to the 48th session and beyond as the situation in Haiti persisted. It is worth 
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noting that all these resolutions on Haiti related to the deterioration of democracy and human 
rights that resulted from the 1991 coup d’état.119 
Other general (ie, not country-specific) but nonetheless noteworthy UNGA resolutions 
adopted around this period include resolutions on ‘Strengthening the role of the United Nations 
in enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections and the 
promotion of democratization’120 (49th Session), which also has a follow-up resolution under 
the same title,121 adopted during the 50th Session of the UNGA. During this session, the UNGA 
also adopted a resolution on the ‘Support by the UN System of the efforts of Governments to 
promote and consolidate new or restored democracies’.122 As recently as 2018 the UNGA 
adopted the resolution on ‘Promotion of a democratic and equitable international order’123 in 
which it recognised democracy, among other things, as a key component in the foundation 
towards social and people-centred sustainable development.124 
(ii) UNGA Resolutions Against Coups d’état (Post-Cold War) 
Other examples of the UNGA’s response to coups d’état include resolutions on the Burundian 
and Honduran coups d’état of 1993 and 2009 respectively. During its 48th session, the UNGA 
adopted a resolution on the situation in Burundi125 where it expressed its deep concern on the 
coup d’état in Burundi, unreservedly condemned it and demanded that the perpetrators thereof 
disarmed and retreated to their barracks.126 It also demanded the prompt ‘restoration of 
democracy and the constitutional regime’. During its 63rd session, the UNGA also adopted a 
resolution expressing its deep concern on the Honduran coup d’état and the breakdown of the 
constitutional and democratic order.127 It went on to condemn the coup d’état and demanded 
the unconditional reinstatement of the constitutional government previously deposed and 
strongly called upon states to only recognize the deposed government. 
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(iii) UNSC Resolutions on Democracy (Post-Cold War) 
The UNSC has, from time to time, adopted resolutions on democracy in the post-cold war era. 
One such example is its resolution on the UN Mission in Haiti (1995)128 where it stressed the 
importance of credible elections as key steps towards the ‘complete consolidation of 
democracy in Haiti.’ It also expressed its concern about irregularities in the Haitian electoral 
exercise of 1995.129 In 1996, the UNSC also adopted another resolution extending the UN 
Mission in Haiti by four more months in order to support the newly elected government in 
Haiti.130 It further emphasised the importance of a peaceful transfer of power to the 
government, while welcoming the democratic election of 1996. In 2002, the UNSC passed a 
resolution on the situation in East Timor,131 in which it reiterated its welcome for the successful 
and peaceful previously held elections, commending the ‘courage and vision’ of people of East 
Timor in driving the country towards independence via ‘peaceful and democratic means’. In 
2011, the UNSC also adopted a resolution concerning Libya132 in which it welcomed 
developments in Libya, improving Libya’s ‘prospects for a democratic, peaceful and 
prosperous future’ and further expressed its anticipation of the establishment of a transitional 
government grounded by a ‘commitment to democracy, good governance, rule of law….’. The 
UNSC also reiterated the same position in its resolution on the UN Mission in Libya,133 in the 
extension of a 2012 resolution in which it reaffirmed the role of the UN and the community of 
states in coordinating the process leading to the formation of a ‘democratic, independent and 
united Libya…’134 
(iv) UNSC Resolutions Against Coups d’état (Post-Cold War) 
The UNSC has, from time to time, issued a series of statements and notes centrally and 
repeatedly condemning coups d’état in the post-cold war era. It has also adopted resolutions 
on coups d’état. In 1994, the UNSC adopted a resolution on the Haitian coup,135 prescribing a 
wide range of sanctions against Haiti’s coup regime, such as travel embargoes.136 It went on to 
authorize the formation of a multinational force to aid the vacating of office by the Haitian 
military regime.137 The UNSC in 1996 also adopted a resolution in which it reiterated its 
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condemnation of the Burundian coup d’état and urged the regime to revert to 
constitutionalism.138 In 2006, the UNSC adopted yet another resolution139 in which it took note, 
with concern, reports of yet another attempted coup d’état in Burundi post the transitional 
period, reaffirming that attempts to seize power in such fashion would be unacceptable. In 
2012, the UNSC also adopted a resolution demanding the restoration of constitutional order in 
Guinea-Bissau140 and reiterating the condemnation by the international community, of the 2012 
coup d’état. It went on to impose travel bans on the Guinea-Bissau coup Leaders.141 
Other than the discussion on treaties above, the discussion on UNSC and UNGA 
resolutions provides insights on international custom, ie, custom that would be universally 
binding, on both subjects of coups d’état and democracy. Both UNGA and UNSC resolutions 
point towards democracy being an ideal and principle at CIL. Unlike the UNGA, it can be 
argued that when it comes to coups d’état, the UNSC, considering its language in its 
resolutions, takes a firmer approach. This suggests that at customary international law as 
deduced from the UNSC resolutions as evidence of sate practice, coups d’état are prohibited. 
This position is further bolstered by the UNSC prescribing the imposition of sanctions on the 
coup regimes, by the community of states. The UNGA resolutions, however, reflect a more 
widespread representation of state practice compared to those of the UNSC whose membership 
is very limited. It is the position of this dissertation that the existence of UNGA resolutions in 
that regard arguably bolsters state practice rejecting coups d’état. Following from this, it can 
be argued that in terms of international custom as reflected by UNGA and UNSC resolutions 
read together, coups d’état are prohibited. Having considered international custom, there is also 
need to take a look at ‘local custom’. 
b) Local Custom 
As highlighted earlier, in some instances, it is possible to have rules that only bind a particular 
group of states.142 This can be referred to as local custom.143 Keeping in mind the high 
prevalence of coups d’état in Africa as illustrated in the 3rd Chapter, there may be an African 
set of customary rules in relation to coup d’état. Such rules would therefore stem from the 
practices of African States, which in turn can be evidenced by African treaties, conventions, 
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and agreements among other things. As noted earlier, the African Union framework in the form 
of the AU Constitutive Act, the Lomé Declaration, and the African Charter on Democracy, 
Elections and Governance, reject coups d’état, among other forms of irregular changes of 
government.144 The African Union/OAU responses to coups d’état have however not been 
entirely consistent in the post-cold war era. 
In light of the context in which the OAU was founded, i.e. decolonisation and anti-
imperialism among other things,145 it follows that the organisation put a high premium on the 
principle of non-interference, which punctuates the traditional conceptions of state sovereignty. 
This arguably led to coups d’état being accepted as legitimate forms of change of 
government.146 As the OAU did not concern itself with the internal matters of states, as 
evidenced by its indifference towards coups d’état, which also persisted after the cold war era, 
it can thus be argued that coups d’état, as a form of change of government, did not traditionally 
contravene any regional/local customary international law norms. 
Unlike the OAU, whose focus was on decolonisation, anti-imperialism and non-
interference,147 the AU was formed with a focus on the promotion of democracy and good 
governance.148 It, therefore, follows that the AU created a strong normative framework around 
democracy and coups d’état, marking a stark contrast from the OAU stance. The AU has, in 
some instances, penalised the seizure of power via coups d’état with suspension from the AU 
and, in some instances, the imposition of embargoes and economic sanctions. Examples of 
these instances include the Guinean coup of 2008,149 Mauritania in 2005 and 2008,150 
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Madagascar in 2009,151 Niger in 2010,152 Mali in 2012,153 Egypt 2012,154 the Central African 
Republic in 2013,155 Burkina Faso in 2015,156 and Sudan In 2019157 where the African Union 
acted swiftly in the suspensions and the imposition of sanctions thereof, directing the countries 
to revert to constitutional order e.g. via a transitional measure, preceding democratic elections. 
The interventions on coups d’état by the AU as noted above have however been 
controversial in certain instances.158 This is because some of the regimes defended by the AU 
had in fact ascended to power via unconstitutional means.159 A prominent example of this is 
the Central African Republic’s coup of 2013 in which the government of President François 
Bozizé was toppled and the AU responded by suspending the CAR from AU activities and, 
imposing sanctions as highlighted above.160 President Bozizé himself had however ascended 
to power via a coup d’état against president Ange-Félix Patassé in 2003.161  
A peculiar case, however, is that of the Zimbabwean coup d’état of 2017 that ended in 
the resignation of long-serving President Robert Mugabe from office162 along with the arrests 
and exile of certain key members of his government. A new administration heavily backed by, 
and including, certain military protagonists subsequently took over. This transition enjoyed 
popular support locally as evidenced the massively attended marches and demonstrations. 
While this operation was condemned in some instances, including by President Alpha 
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Conde,163 the Leader of Guinea, who also chaired the African Union at the time, the African 
Union itself, however, issued a statement in which it did not classify the military operation as 
a coup but rather ‘a popular expression’ of the will of the Zimbabwean people.164 This was yet 
again in stark contrast with the AU position taken in the case of the toppling of Egypt’s 
Mahomed Morsi via a coup d’état that similarly enjoyed popular support.165 Unlike in the 
Zimbabwean scenario, Egypt was suspended from AU activities in the wake of the coup 
d’état.166 Instances such as the Zimbabwean scenario, being isolated and fairly uncommon, 
can, however, be argued to be exceptions to the growing norm of rejecting coups. 
A generalised assessment of the OAU/AU’s position on coups d’état points towards a 
somewhat inconsistent approach. A shift is however discernible in the approaches of the OAU 
(pre 2002) and the AU (post the OAU era), with the OAU exercising restraint on internal 
matters of states, thus making coups d’état a common means of governmental change, while 
there is a pattern of rejecting coups d’état in the AU era. Following from this, and 
notwithstanding the inconsistency in state practice in certain instances, it is submitted that there 
is a local customary prohibition of coups d’état in Africa. The gradual development of this 
position is also evidenced by the gradual decline in the prevalence of coups d’état in Africa 
over time, as illustrated via the data analysis carried out in Chapter 3.167 It is also strengthened 
further by the existence of African treaties and protocols rejecting coups d’état. 
c) Specially Affected States Doctrine (SAS) 
The essence of the express articulation of the SAS doctrine by the ICJ in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf case168 is that practice resulting in the formation of customary international 
law should include the practice of states ‘whose interests were specially affected.’169 Since 
delivering this judgment in 1969, the ICJ is yet to develop this doctrine further in its 
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judgments170 although it has in some instances implicitly relied upon the doctrine as was the 
case in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case171 (1974). This has inevitably resulted in uncertainty as 
to the content, scope, proper function and interpretation of the SAS Doctrine under 
international law. This doctrine has also been rarely invoked, with only three countries, namely 
the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States of America, having formally cited it to 
date.172 Two main questions appear to stick out as far as the SAS doctrine is concerned. The 
first one is that of when a state should be considered as being specially affected.173 The second 
one has to do with the importance of the practice of the SAS in question in the formation of 
custom.174 
The most prominent instances of the invocation of the SAS doctrine post the North Sea 
Continental shelf case have been by the United States of America, which have all been in the 
context of armed conflict. The USA, in the Nuclear Weapons case175 adopted the stance that 
customary law could not emerge over the objections of the states that held nuclear weapons.176 
From this, it can be discerned that in terms of the US’ conception of the doctrine, a state would 
count as being specially affected by simply participating in practice whose customary status is 
in question177 rather than being potentially or actually prejudiced or harmed. The USA’s 
conception of the doctrine arguably concentrates power to form custom in the hands of more 
powerful states, while also giving the ‘specially affected states’ ultimate dominion in the 
formation of custom.178 This conception has been seconded by several scholars in the global 
north, thus putting a premium on the role and importance of powerful states in developing 
custom.179 Arguably, such a conception however inevitably disregards the practice of weaker 
states, especially in the global south. This, in turn, may inevitably result in the distortion of 
customary international law as a whole given the importance of the practice of states in its 
formation. 
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In a different conception, the African Union (AU) also recently invoked the SAS 
doctrine in the Chagos Island dispute, arguing for the consideration of African and post-
colonial states as ‘specially affected’ in the matter on the status of the decolonisation of 
Mauritius under CIL.180 Other than the geographical facet (ie, the respective states’ location), 
this conception seems to shift the classification of SAS to those that have, historically or 
otherwise, been on the receiving end of a particular practice.181 In this particular context, the 
conception does seem to protect states in the global south, unlike in the case of the USA’s 
conception. 
It should, however, be noted that the importance of the specially affected states over 
the non-specially affected-states in the creation of international custom is incontrovertible 
given the insistence by the ICJ in the North Sea Continental shelf case182 that state practice 
cannot be deemed to be ‘widespread and representative’ unless it encompasses that of specially 
affected states.183 Such insistence by the ICJ is particularly key because, notwithstanding the 
fact that its rulings are not universally binding,184 the ICJ is widely regarded as bearing an 
authoritative voice when interpreting international law.185 
The ICJ jurisprudence, however, seems to suggest two classes of states that count as 
being ‘specially affected’ namely states that exclusively partake in a particular practice (North 
Sea Continental Shelf),186 and states uniquely affected by a particular practice to the exclusion 
of other states (Fisheries Jurisdiction, Marshall Island cases).187  
It has been established that Africa has historically experienced the highest prevalence 
of coups d’état compared to any other continent. By virtue of this, African states can be deemed 
as being ‘specially affected’, not only based on their geographical location, but also because 
they have been, and continue to be, more susceptible to coups due to a number of factors that 
have existed historically on the continent, and, remain persistent. These factors, as discussed 
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in chapter three, include a range of socio-economic and political factors among other things, 
which have persisted and remain extant.188 It is, however, difficult to apply the USA’s 
conception of the SAS doctrine to the Context of coups d’état in Africa, firstly considering the 
context in which it was invoked by the USA (ie jus ad bellum). The requirement of the state 
merely being a ‘participant’ in the practice in question does seem quite vague and unspecific. 
It should however be noted that coups d’état as discussed in this research, typically do only 
take place internally, with the states experiencing coups d’état being the only states 
‘participant’. This, therefore, means in accordance with the USA’s version of the SAS doctrine, 
African states count as being ‘specially affected’, as far as coups d’état are concerned. 
Turning to the African Union’s conception of the SAS doctrine as expressed in the 
Chagos Island dispute ie, of specially affected states being those that have, historically or 
otherwise, been on the receiving end of a particular practice, African states, having historically 
experienced more coups d’état globally and remaining prone to coups d’état at present, count 
as being specially affected. This means that as far as coups d’état are concerned, whichever 
interpretation used (ie the USA’s or the African Union’s) African states can be classified as 
being specially affected. Following from this, the African approach of rejecting coups d’état, 
therefore, takes precedence in the determination of Customary International Law on coups 
d’état. Further, the African approach as reflected in the practice of the specially affected states, 
coupled with the widespread and representative rejection of coups d’état as perceived through 
the UNGA and UNSC resolutions among other things, ultimately reflects a Customary 
International Law proscription of coups d’état. It is also this research’s position that Africa, 
being specially affected by the scourge of coups d’état and having a more express local 
customary rejection of coups d’état, has and continues to in fact play a leading role in the 
development of a general proscription of coups d’état, under customary international law. 
d) Problems with the CIL on coups d’état 
A key characteristic of CIL is that it is generally uncodified. Following from this, CIL is a 
dynamic source of international law, whose content is bound to change from time to time. As 
an example, state practice at some point reflected the exercise of extreme restraint when it came 
to the internal affairs of states as alluded to earlier. This included the form of transition from 
one government to another. It can therefore be argued that coups d’état once used to be an 
acceptable means of governmental change thus being commonplace. There however has been 
 




an apparent shift in state practice with coups increasingly being rejected in the post-cold war 
era. Following from this, it is the position of this dissertation that there is an international 
customary law proscription of coups d’état. The fluid nature of CIL coupled with it being 
unwritten, however, exposes the problem of the uncertainty of the Customary International 
Law on coups d’état. This, in turn, can be argued to have led to a somewhat inconsistent 
response to coups d’état by the community of states with some coups d’état being totally 
rejected, coupled with the imposition of sanctions among other forms of intervention, while in 
some instances, like the Zimbabwean coup d’état of 2017,189 this approach has not been 
adhered to. 
In light of the problems with the CIL on coups d’état, notwithstanding the noted decline 
in the prevalence of coups d’état in Africa, African states remain prone to coups d’état and 
they have continued to occur.  
 
V. COUP D'ÉTAT AS WRONGFUL ACTS AT INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The existence of international law norms against coups d’état is independent of the question of 
whether coups d’état do in fact amount to wrongful acts under international law. Having 
established the international law norms on coups d’état, it is therefore important to separately 
interrogate whether coups d’état amount to wrongful acts at international law. Questions 
relating to wrongful acts under international law are often deemed as inextricably linked to that 
of State Responsibility as international law recognises states as its primary subjects.190 The 
International Law Commission (ILC) draft articles on state responsibility191 designate every 
wrongful act of a state at international law as entailing the international responsibility of the 
state.192 For something to amount to an internationally wrongful act of a state, it should be a 
commission or omission 1) attributable to the state at international law193 and, 2) amounting to 
a breach of an international obligation by the state.194  
A massive hurdle would, however, be that of attributing a coup d’état to a state. This is 
because as discussed in the 2nd Chapter, coups d’état ‘consist of the infiltration of a small but 
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critical segment of the state apparatus, usually the military, which is then used to overthrow 
the government from its control on the state.195 Given that coups d’état are usually conducted 
by elements of the military, which are typically recognised as being organs of, or individuals 
operating under the authority of the state, it is also tempting to conclude that coups d’état are 
therefore attributable to the state. Such attribution attaches to the state even in instances where 
the organs or individuals in question act in excess of their authority.196 In the event of the 
military elements in question being deemed as not being organs of the state, their conduct may 
still be attributable to the state if they end up being part of the substantive governments of the 
states in question.197 In the absence of the actions of the military operations in question being 
attributable to a foreign state, the attribution of coups d’état discussed above presents an 
illogical situation in which a state ought to be held responsible for organising and carrying out 
a coup d’état against itself. This, therefore, makes the attribution of a coup d’état to a state 
virtually impossible. It is therefore tempting to conclude that unless attributable to states, coups 
d’état are not wrongful acts at international law. Considering the existence of customary norms 
against coup d’état as established earlier, it is, however, this research’s position that coups 
d’état do in fact amount to a breach of an international law obligation to observe democracy 
and not overthrow a constitutionally elected government. It is thus submitted that by 
contravening international law norms, coups d’état amount to wrongful acts at international 
law. This, it is submitted, is an example of the scope of international law going beyond states-
it’s primary subjects. 
 
VI. DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AS A RIGHT AT INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 
The subjects of coups d’état and democracy are inextricably linked as evidenced by the 
prominence of ‘democracy’ in this chapter’s discussion of coups d’état. Further, coups d’état 
are arguably an antithesis of democracy. The question emerging from this however is one of 
whether democracy can be deemed as a right under international law. The term ‘Democracy’ 
is nowhere in the United Nations Charter or even the Covenant of the League of Nations.198 
Furthermore, even the standard International Law textbooks are void of chapters concerned 
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with ‘democracy’ and, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has never grounded any of its 
rulings on the legal foundation of democratic norms.199 This can be interpreted as International 
law being indifferent to the idea of democracy being a right in international law.200 With this 
in mind, coupled with the traditional conceptions of sovereignty and the principle of non-
interference, any attempts by ‘democratic’ members of the community of states to impose their 
model of governance, among other things, onto their ‘undemocratic’ counterparts would 
traditionally be in contravention of International law. A similar analogy is reflected in the 
Nicaragua Case (merits)201 where the ICJ dismissed the USA’s contention that it had a right 
to intervene in the affairs of Nicaragua, in support of ‘political and moral’ values of the internal 
opposition.202  
Contrary to that position, state practice alluded to in this chapter however increasingly 
appears to place a high premium on democracy. This is evident as certain governments, along 
with their actions, have been condemned and sometimes sanctioned for conduct deemed as 
undemocratic. This validates Franck’s idea of an emerging right to democratic governance at 
international law.203 Following from this, the democratic entitlement has gradually evolved 
from merely being rooted in morality, towards becoming a key requirement under international 
law.204 He further argues that governments increasingly recognize that their legitimacy is 
dependent upon meeting normative expectations of the community of states.205 Such 
recognition has resulted in the emergence of a concomitant expectation by the community of 
states that ‘those who seek the validation of their empowerment patently govern with the 
consent of the governed’.206 This requirement, he argues, is applicable to all and is implemented 
via global standards, with the aid of both international and regional organizations.207 Petersen 
agrees and goes on to consider, as his point of departure, the idea of an emerging right to 
democratic governance as posited by Franck. He, however, argues that while there may be an 
emergence of a right to democratic governance, democracy is in reality not a strict obligation 
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at international law and it takes the form of a teleological principle.208 This means that states 
therefore essentially bear an obligation to strive and evolve towards democracy and to reinforce 
and optimize it post the establishment of electoral institutions.209 This can be concisely referred 
to as democratization. Rather than there being a right to democratic governance, Petersen posits 
that a teleological principle exists at international law, where states are under an obligation to 
evolve towards democracy.210 
While there is evidence of the widespread recognition of the democracy as evidenced 
by state practice, the continued existence of states that do not subscribe to this form of 
government is worth acknowledging. Even though international law may be deemed to have 
welcomed the concept of democracy, it is backed by inconsistent state practice. It is therefore 
tempting to conclude that democracy remains just a general principle at international law and 
is not firmly anchored in the traditional sources of international law. It is however this chapter’s 
position that although not being necessarily universal, the recognition of democracy remains 
widespread. Democracy is, therefore, beyond a general principle at International law. It has 
since evolved into a right, derogation from which has warranted condemnation from the 
community of states. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This chapter considered the international law norms on coups d’état. It has also been noted that 
coups d’état, being increasingly deemed as antagonistic towards international law norms on 
democracy and the unconstitutional deposition of democratically elected governments, amount 
to wrongful acts at international law. This is notwithstanding the impossibility of attributing a 
coup d’état to a state. This was, in some instances, considered from an international, 
continental, and regional standpoint. The chapter began by briefly looking into the doctrine of 
state sovereignty. This is because state sovereignty is deemed to be an essential component of 
international law and, it arguably implies that the internal affairs of states are sacrosanct. From 
this, it was submitted that prima facie, international law does not proscribe coups d’état in any 
way as it does not concern itself with the internal affairs of states. In order to test this position, 
 
208 Petersen Niels ‘The Principle of Democratic Teleology in International Law’ (2008) 24 Brooklyn Journal of 
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the chapter then turned to the sources of international law namely treaties, custom, general 
principles and judicial decisions and the teachings and writings of international law scholars. 
The chapter submitted that there is no express proscription of coups d’état by 
conventions/ treaties. It, however, acknowledged the recognition given to the notion of 
democracy, particularly by the UDHR, CEDAW, and ICCPR, among other treaties as 
translating to an implicit proscription of coups d’état under international law. The chapter also 
acknowledged the existence of a CIL recognition of democracy as a general principle, along 
with a customary international law proscription of coups d’état. The chapter also considered 
the OAU/AU position on coups d’état and established that while this generalised assessment 
points towards an inconsistent approach, a shift is however apparent in the approaches of the 
OAU (pre 2002) and the AU (post the OAU era). The OAU has traditionally exercised restraint 
on internal matters of states thus making coups d’état a common means of governmental 
change. This is unlike the AU era where there has been a pattern of rejecting coups d’état, 
albeit not entirely consistent. Following from this, the chapter argued that the pattern is 
indicative of African ‘local custom’ proscribing coups d’état.  
The chapter then considered the SAS doctrine, as local custom is key in establishing 
customary international law in light of this doctrine. Keeping in mind the fact that Africa has 
had a disproportionately high prevalence of coups globally as established in the 3rd Chapter, 
this chapter submitted that the local African custom of rejecting coups d’état, coupled with the 
widespread rejection of coups d’état, reflects customary international law against coups d’état. 
It also submitted that African states, being specially affected by coups d’état, have played a 
leading role in the development of this norm. The chapter also looked at the shortcomings of 
the customary international law thereof, highlighting uncertainty, which in turn, has arguably 
resulted in inconsistency in the response to coups d’état and in the treatment of coup regimes 
in Africa. As far as the idea of democratic governance as a right at international law is 
concerned, it has been submitted that democracy has evolved from being just a general 






CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
I. CHAPTER SUMMARIES & CONCLUSIONS  
Coups d’état have historically been a common means of governmental change. They, however, 
seem to have been more common and recurrent in Africa than elsewhere and remain a threat 
in African politics. Among other things, coups d’état have yielded bloodshed and instability. 
They have also been condemned in many instances. In some cases, such condemnation has 
been questioned and argued to be an infraction of the sovereignty of states. This is because the 
sovereignty of states has often been considered the bedrock of international law as states are 
the primary subjects of international law. Arguably, state sovereignty implies that the internal 
affairs of states remain sacrosanct and ought to be immune to any external interference. Such 
affairs arguably include the transfer of governmental power. ‘Sovereignty’ has been 
characterised as an unsettled concept at international law.1 It can, however, be truncated to the 
idea of a state having ultimate dominion over its own affairs,2 with the exception of where the 
state expressly consents to give away such dominion.3 Within this background, there has been 
uncertainty regarding international law’s position on coups d’état. 
Coups d’état and revolutions share the commonality of being regarded as irregular 
forms of change of government. Following from this, there is sometimes a conflation between 
the two. Coups d’état ‘consist of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of the state 
apparatus, which is then used to displace the government from its control of the remainder’.4 
Revolutions, on the other hand, can be defined as ‘irregular, extraconstitutional, and sometimes 
violent changes of political regimes and control of state power brought about by popular 
movements.’5 Coups are typically carried out by ‘the military or other elites within the state 
apparatus’6 thus commonly being referred to as ‘military coups’. The military officers may 
then go on to form the next government or, install a civilian government, while usually 
maintaining their control and influence in the establishment vicariously. Coups can be ‘bloody’ 
 
1 Tom W Bennet and Jonathan Strugg ‘Introduction to International Law’ (2013) at 47. 
2 Nico Schrijver ‘The Changing Nature of State Sovereignty’ (2000) at 71. 
3 Stephen D Krasner ‘The Hole in the Whole: Sovereignty, Shared Sovereignty, and International Law’ (2004) 
at 1077. 
4 Edward Luttwak Coup d'État: A Practical Handbook (1969) 172. 
5 Jeff Goodwin No Other Way Out STATE AND REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS 1945-1991 (2001) 9. 
6 Nhlalo Ndaba ‘Army trucks in Harare spark panic; military insiders urge calm’ Times LIVE 14 November 
2017, available at https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2017-11-14-army-trucks-in-harare-spark-panic-




or ‘bloodless’ with the former characterised by violent means and fatalities,7 while in terms of 
the latter, only the threat of use of force is employed as the means to seize power.8 Coups d’état 
can further be classified as successful or failed, among other things.9 Successful coups d’état 
ultimately culminate in a change of government but in terms of a failed coup, the operation is 
thwarted thereby not effecting any change.10 While other coups d’état are deemed to be 
good/democratic, it should be noted that coups d’état are in themselves counteractive to 
democracy, illegal, and inevitably result in gross violations of human rights be it during the 
staging of the coup or in the incumbency of the coup regimes. There is also a likelihood that 
continued absence of political order thus leading to perpetual instability foments the recurrence 
of coups d’état witnessed in many countries as, arguably, coups d’état sire other coups d’état. 
Further, coups inevitably set the stage for human rights violations among other things. 
On a global scale, Africa has had a disproportionately high prevalence of coups d’état 
than other continents. Geographically, the coups d’état are unevenly distributed across Africa, 
with half of the total coups d’état between 1950 and 2017 being in West Africa. The 
distribution of coups d’état has also varied temporally. There has however been a notable 
decline in coups d’état per decade in Africa since 1980. It is worth noting that the African 
countries with the highest prevalence of coups d’état are generally in close proximity with each 
other. Further, most coups d’état have been witnessed in older African states by date of 
independence. It is ultimately worth noting that coups d’état globally have occurred in mostly 
marginalized, underdeveloped and low-income states. Arguably this description matches most 
African states. As far as Africa is concerned, the conditions that have historically resulted in 
coups d’état remain extant. Africa, therefore, remains susceptible to coups d’état.  
Considering the place and function of the principle of state sovereignty at international 
law, a prima facie argument to the effect that international law does not proscribe coups d’état 
can be made. It, therefore, follows that there is no express proscription of coups d’état by 
international conventions/ treaties. It has however been noted that the recognition given to the 
notion of democracy by some treaties/conventions such as UDHR, CEDAW, and ICCPR, may 
arguably amount to an implicit proscription of coups d’état under international law. This 
 
7 Luttwak op cit note 4. 
8 Fundikila Wazambi ‘Military Coup D’état against Democratically Elected Governments in Africa and 
International Law: The Recent Cases of Mali and Egypt’ (2015) 9. 
9 Monty G. Marshall and Donna Ramsey Marshall ‘Coups d’état Events, 1946-2017 Codebook’ (2018) Center 
for Systemic Peace at 1. 
10 See Jonathan Powell ‘Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d'état’ (2012) 6 The Journal of 




recognition, along with state practice as evidenced by UNGA and UNSC resolutions among 
other things, points towards a Customary International Law recognition of democracy as a 
general principle, along with a customary international law proscription of coups d’état. 
Further, In light of this research’s focus on Africa, while a generalised assessment of the 
OAU/AU’s position on coups d’état points towards an inconsistent approach, a shift is however 
discernible in the approaches of the OAU (pre 2002) and the AU (post the OAU era), with the 
OAU exercising restraint on internal matters of states thus making coups d’état a common 
means of governmental change, while there is a pattern of rejecting coups d’état in the AU era, 
albeit not entirely consistent. This also arguably points towards a ‘local custom’ proscription 
of coups d’état as far as Africa is concerned. Such ‘local custom’ is of paramount importance 
in ascertaining the customary international law on coups d’état in line with the SAS doctrine 
as it has also been established that Africa has historically experienced a disproportionate 
number of coups d’état globally thus making African states ‘specially affected’. Following 
from this, such local custom of rejecting coups d’état, coupled with the widespread rejection 
of coups d’état, amounts to customary international law against coups d’état. It can thus be 
argued that Africa has led the way in the development of a customary proscription of coups 
d’état under international law. It must also be noted that coups d’état do amount to wrongful 
acts at international law regardless of it being difficult to attribute them to a state thus making 
it impossible for state responsibility to ensue. Further, under international law, democracy has 
since evolved into a right, the derogation of which warrants condemnation from the community 
of states.  
 
II. RECOMMENDATIONS  
This dissertation alluded to the existence of customary international law proscribing coups 
d’état. It also acknowledged that there has been a notable decline in the prevalence of coups 
d’état in Africa, suggesting that this trend is evidence of the increase in the prominence of state 
practice condemning coups d’état. Notwithstanding this downward trend, the dissertation 
however conceded that the customary international law rejecting coups d’état has not managed 
to completely do away with the prevalence of coups d’état in Africa. This has been attributed 
to the uncertainty of the customary international law, stemming from its unwritten nature. 
Further, the factors and circumstances believed to have traditionally fomented coups d’état in 
Africa remain extant thus African states remaining susceptible to coups d’état. These factors 




a single dominant ethnic group, among other factors. Following from this, the dissertation 
conceded that the effectiveness of customary international law is inherently limited. This means 
that the solution thereof cannot solely emerge from within the realm of international law. 
Turning back to certainty concerns emanating from the uncodified nature of customary 
international law, the dissertation accepts that this, among other things, can sometimes be 
linked to the inconsistency in the response and treatment of coups d’état and coup regimes 
respectively. This, therefore, calls for a firm and concise legal instrument immune to such 
curtailment. It, therefore, follows that this dissertation reiterates the calls for a UN treaty 
specifically directed at warding off coups d’état.11 This would be key as international 
conventions/ treaties are arguably the most frequent and specific conduits through which rules 
under international law are created12 and, they do away with the uncertainty that typically 
plagues customary international law. The treaty need not necessarily forge new rules on coups 
d’état. It can merely be a codification of what are perceived to be the rules per customary 
international law. Keeping in mind that treaties typically solely bind their signatories, this 
dissertation submits that such a treaty is likely to succeed and be widely accepted given the 
already existent state practice of rejecting coups d’état. Arguably, it is also likely to attract 
many incumbent regimes seeking to shield themselves from the scourge of coups d’état as 
signatories.  
 
11 See Siegfried Pausewang ‘A UN Convention to Ward Off Coups d'Etat?’ (1992) 23 Bulletin of Peace Proposals 
1 67-70. 
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